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The Macroeconomic Impacts of Natural Disasters: New Evidence from Floods 
Abstract 
We analyze the economic impacts of floods using new data on 3,184 large flood events in 118 
countries between 1985 and 2008. We use panel vector auto-regressions to trace the dynamic 
response of output to three types of flood shocks. Our results robustly indicate that flood shocks 
tend to have a positive average impact on GDP growth, that this impact is limited to developing 
countries, that the effect is not confined to the agricultural sector, and that it is stronger when it is 
accompanied by an increase in gross fixed capital formation.  
1. Introduction 
In addition to the immediate cost of natural disasters in terms of mortality, number of displaced 
people and infrastructural damage, and perhaps partly due to these immediate costs, natural 
disasters may have a lasting effect on economic output and growth. In this paper we investigate 
the macroeconomic impacts of floods using panel vector auto-regressions (panel VAR) to 
characterize the output growth dynamics following large flood events.  
Among all the types of natural disasters, analyzing the macroeconomic impacts of floods 
is particularly relevant for at least two reasons. First, according to the EM-DAT global disaster 
database (OFDA/CRED 2010), between 1985 and 2009, floods were the most common natural 
disaster, accounting for 40 percent of all natural disasters (another 31 percent were storms).
1 
Combined, floods and storms represented 44 percent of the deaths, 67 percent of the number of 
                                                           
1 To be included in the database, an event needs to fulfill at least one of the following criteria: (i) 10 or more people 
killed, (ii) 100 or more people reported affected (typically displaced); (iii) a declaration of a state of emergency; (iv) 
a call for international assistance.  Apart from floods and storms, other natural disasters recorded in the EM-DAT 
database are earthquakes, extreme temperatures, droughts, wildfires, wet and dry mass movements, and volcanoes. 
Although recorded separately, floods and storms are related disasters; for example a cyclone may generate a flood. 2 
 
people affected and the bulk of economic damages caused by natural disasters. Second, if climate 
change results in an increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, including 
storms and floods, knowing whether or not floods have net permanent effects on economic 
output and the details of the adjustment path may prove very useful to direct adaptation efforts. 
Recent attempts to evaluate the long-run impact of natural disasters on GDP offer an 
inconclusive picture regarding the sign of the impacts of disasters on GDP growth and whether 
these impacts are transitory or permanent. For example Skidmore and Toya (2002) find that 
climatic events have a positive relationship with long run growth (which they argue could be due 
to disasters providing an impetus for 'creative destruction' dynamics) while Raddatz (2009) finds 
the opposite effect. Hochrainer (2009) also finds that, on average, severe natural disasters have 
negative consequences on GDP.  More recently, Cavallo et al. (2010) construct counterfactual 
synthetic countries unaffected by disasters, and find no significant long-run effect of disasters on 
per capita GDP.  Cavallo and Noy (2010) provide a review of the literature.  
Controlling for disaster type and size may prove to be fundamental in this context. For 
example, Fomby et al. (2009) find that droughts have a negative effect on economic growth. In 
contrast, floods tend to have a positive effect. This effect is stronger in developing countries and 
is present in both the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. The authors argue that by 
increasing soil fertility, a typical flood increases agricultural output in the year after it strikes 
(though output falls in the year it occurs). The benefits from higher agricultural production spill 
over to other sectors, and in developing countries where the farm sector is a bigger part of the 
economy this may be enough to lead to faster growth in manufacturing and services in 
subsequent years. However, this effect comes only from moderate floods. Severe floods do not 
produce positive responses of GDP growth or its two components. 3 
 
Our paper uses a new flood-specific disaster dataset to analyze the output growth 
response in the year of and the years after a flood shock. Our contribution to the literature is 
twofold. First, we use three alternative definitions of flood shock: experiencing an additional 
„typical‟ large flood event, experiencing an exogenous increase in the magnitude of the average 
flood, and an increase in the death toll.  Most of the papers on the economics of natural disasters 
define severity of a disaster as a function of the number of people killed or affected by floods, 
which, although arguably correlated with the physical intensity of a disaster, might be 
determined by a country‟s macroeconomic and institutional setting (Kahn 2005; Anbarci et al. 
2005; Kellenberg and Mobarak 2008; Keefer et al. 2010).  Our dataset includes information on 
physical measures of the magnitude of the flood events (area affected, duration in days, and 
length of the recurrence interval).   
Second, we explore potential channels through which floods may affect economic output 
levels and growth. As Fomby et al. (2009), we distinguish between agricultural and non-
agricultural output growth and separate our sample into developing and developed countries. In 
addition, we control for availability of domestic credit to the private sector to measure the degree 
to which households can borrow to self-protect against (and perhaps take advantage of) floods. 
We also control for the quality of governance proxied by indicators of corruption and ethnic 
conflict, as these may determine the efficiency of the public response to large flood events. 
Finally, we control for fixed capital formation that could follow when large floods damage 
preexisting infrastructure that needs to be fixed or replaced.   
The rest of paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data. Section 3 
describes the panel VAR methodology employed to construct the dynamic response of output to 





We compiled an unbalanced panel with annual data on the number and physical intensity of 
floods, and macroeconomic variables to trace the potential long-run economic effect of floods, 
for 118 countries during the period 1985-2008. Table 1 summarizes the variables and the data 
sources.  
2.1. Growth variables 
The main variables used in this paper are divided into three groups. First, we define three 
growth variables: the growth rate of real per capita GDP and, following Fomby et al. (2009), the 
growth rate of real per capita value added in the agricultural and the non-agricultural sectors. The 
three variables are measured as the log difference of per capita GDP (in PPP, constant 2005 
international $). They come from the World Development Indicators (WDI 2010).  Table 2 
shows basic descriptive statistics for the all countries in the sample, and for the subsamples of 
developing and the developed countries. Overall growth was 2.2 percent (2.1 percent in 
developing countries, 2.3 percent in developed countries), with a decline in the agricultural 
sector during the period (the rate of growth in agricultural output was -1.7 percent in developing 
countries and -3.2 percent in developed countries). 
2.2. Flood variables 
The second set of variables, describing the flood events during 1985-2008, originates 
from the Global Archive of Large Flood Events kept by the Dartmouth Flood Observatory (DFO, 
now at Colorado: http://floodobservatory.colorado.edu).  It covers large flood events with 
"significant damage to structures or agriculture, long (decades) reported intervals since the last 5 
 
similar event, and/or fatalities."
2  DFO reports the magnitude of the flood as the log of the 
product of flood duration (in days)* area affected by the flood * flood severity. Floods are 
divided into three severity classes depending on their estimated recurrence interval. Class 1 
floods have a 10-20 year-long reported interval between similar events, class 1.5 have a 20-100 
year recurrence interval, and class 2 have a recurrence interval greater than 100 years.  
The unit of observation in the DFO dataset is the flood event (2,194 observations in our 
sample). Since the panel used in the econometric estimation consists of annual observations for 
118 countries, we defined three new variables at the country-year level: total number of floods; 
average magnitude, computed as the log of (average area affected by flooding * average flood 
duration * average flood severity); and total number of deaths which is the sum of deaths in all 
the flood events during the year. Multi-country floods are excluded from the sample.  
According to Table 2, in a given year there is an average of one flood in a given country 
in our sample, with no significant difference between developing and developed countries. The 
magnitude of the average flood, however, is slightly larger in developing countries than in 
developed countries (5.49 vs. 3.63) and this difference is statistically significant. The annual 
death toll is also larger (but not significantly so) in developing countries than in developed 
countries with averages of 308 and 10 annual casualties, respectively.   
Table 3 shows the contemporaneous correlations between the growth and flood variables, 
distinguishing between developing and developed countries. As shown in the table, the 
contemporaneous correlations between the two physical measures of flooding (the number of 
floods and average magnitude) and per capita GDP growth are positive for developing countries, 
                                                           
2 DFO uses a collection of tools to detect and locate flood events, such as MODIS (Moderate Resolution Imaging 
Spectroradiometer, http://modis.gsfc.nasa.gov) and optical remote sensing, which provide frequent updates of 
worldwide surface water condition. These are complemented with data derived from a variety of news and 
governmental sources. 6 
 
while it is negative for developed countries. These correlations are at odds with the conventional 
wisdom that disasters are more likely to have negative growth effects in poor countries as these 
may lack the material resources and organisational ability to get back to the status quo ante. 
2.3. Other macro variables 
The third set of variables comprises institutional and macroeconomic variables in order to 
control for country differences and investigate potential channels of transmission of the impact 
of a flood shock. They are two institutional indicators of corruption and ethnic tensions, domestic 
credit to private sector (as percentage of GDP), and gross fixed capital formation (as percentage 
of GDP). 
  The institutional indicators come from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) of 
Political Risk Services (PRS 2010).
3 Indicators take values between 0 and 6 with higher values 
denoting better governance. From excerpts of the variable descriptions, corruption "distorts the 
economic and financial environment; it reduces the efficiency of government and business by 
enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability; and, [...], 
introduces an inherent instability into the political process"; ethnic tensions is "the degree of 
tension within a country attributable to racial, nationality, or language divisions. " Escaleras et al 
(2007) and Keefer et al. (2010) find that earthquake mortality increases with corruption; ethnic 
tensions can also result in reduced efficiency in the provision of public services needed for 
reconstruction after a natural disaster.  
Domestic credit to the private sector captures access to investments by the private sector 
that could be used, for example, for self-protection from floods and reconstruction efforts after 
                                                           
3 The ICRG is a popular source of governance indicators used in cross-country studies. It offers broad country 
coverage, which reduces the risk of selection bias (Kaufmann et al. 1999; Johnston 2001), and indicators are 
available for a relatively long time period (1984 to the present), which covers our estimation sample. 7 
 
the floods, with gross fixed capital formation also capturing this second effect. Both variables 
come from WDI (2010).  
3. Methods 
The paper uses pooled observations from 118 countries over time to arrive at average responses 
of growth to major flood events. Like Fomby et al. (2009) and Raddatz (2007, 2009) we employ 
vector auto-regressions in the presence of endogenous variables and exogenous shocks (panel 
VARX):
4  
it it it i it X L B Y L A Y       ) ( ) (               (1) 
where Yit is a vector of endogenous variables for country i at time t, X is a vector of exogenous 
variables, i  is a fixed effect for each country, and it is a vector of independent error terms. 
A(L) and B(L) are matrix polynomials in the lag operator whose order is determined using the 
Akaike information criterion. The vector of endogenous variables comprises the per capita 
growth rate
5 (distinguishing between agricultural and non agricultural rates), and other 
macroeconomic variables (domestic credit to the private sector, corruption and ethnic tensions, 
and gross fixed capital formation). As exogenous variables, we include the flood variables 
defined in the previous section (number of floods, average magnitude, and number of deaths).  
As a first step, and in order to justify the classification of some variables as exogenous, 
we pursued Granger causality tests, as a test for the weak exogenity of the flood variables. A 
variable is said to Granger cause another variable if there is enough evidence to reject the null 
                                                           
4 In a simple VAR model all variables are assumed to be endogenous, while in a VARX model some variables can 
be exogenous. 
5 We analyzed the integration order of each of our variables, concluding that per capita GDP variables are all I(1) 
non stationary, while their first differences are I(0) stationary variables, so we include per capita GDP growth rates 
in our VAR setting.  
 8 
 
hypothesis that the coefficients on the lags of variable x in the VAR equation of variable y are all 
equal to zero. The results, not presented here but available upon request, reveal evidence of 
causality between flood variables to economic growth rates, while, as expected, growth rates are 
not found to have significant effects on future flood occurrence.  
 
4. Results 
Based on the estimation of equation (1), we calculated the impulse response functions tracing out 
the  reaction  of  per  capita  GDP  growth  and  of  its  subcomponents,  agricultural  and  non-
agricultural per capital value-added growth, to a flood shock. 
4.1 Impulse response functions 
 Figure 1 depicts the dynamic path of adjustment to an exogenous additional flood in year 
1 and in subsequent periods (up to year 10). As in Fomby et al. (2009), our results indicate that 
floods tend to have a positive effect on GDP growth. The cumulative mean effect, shown in 
Table 4, is 1.5 percentage points.  
Looking at the annual response of the growth rate, the positive effect of the flood is 
significant the year after the event and it peaks two years after the event. This delay in the overall 
growth response seems to be driven by the agricultural sector for which the effect on the year of 
the event is negative (although not significant). The effect on agricultural growth spikes the year 
after the flood which, as Fomby et al. (2009) point out, could be due to potentially beneficial 
effects of floods on land productivity that emerge on the following harvest cycle. Looking at the 
split between developing and developed countries lends support to this argument. The sharp 
increase  on  agricultural  growth  in  the  year  after  the  flood  is  larger  and  more  persistent  in 
developing countries which typically rely on more traditional, less intensive forms of agriculture. 9 
 
The cumulative mean impact of the flood shock on agricultural growth is 2.2 percentage points 
for developing countries and 1.2 percentage points for developed countries. 
The response to a flood shock is not limited to the agricultural sector. The cumulative 
mean effect of the non-agricultural sector growth for the full sample is positive (2.0 percentage 
points), significant and slightly larger than the response of the agricultural sector (1.9 percentage 
points).  Again,  the  response  is  different  between  developing  and  developed  countries.  In 
developed countries the industry and services sector growth does not have a significant response 
(neither cumulatively nor in any year of or after the shock). In developing countries the effect of 
the flood on non-agricultural output growth is significant (the cumulative effect is 3 pp.). It peaks 
the  year  after  the  event.  This  effect,  could  be  due  to  a  larger  relative  importance  of  the 
agricultural sector in these countries whose growth spills over to manufacturing and services. 
Fomby et al. (2009) point at transmission mechanisms based on supply chain relationships (for 
instance, larger cotton production resulting in expanded textile production) and an increase in 
electricity  generating  capacity  from  an  increase  in  water  supply.  This  second  mechanism, 
however, requires that the infrastructure needed to generate hydroelectricity is in place. Another 
possible explanation that we test in the following subsection is that after a flood, reconstruction 
efforts result in increased industrial activity arising from the investment necessary to replace or 
fix damaged infrastructures. 
In Figure 2, we trace the response of output growth to a different type of flood shock: an 
increase of one standard deviation in the magnitude of the average flood. The patterns are similar 
to the case of an additional flood. The effect on GDP growth is positive, transitory (it reverts to 
the mean after approximately 10 periods, and significant only in developing countries. As with 
the simple correlations in Table 3, these results are at odds with the conventional wisdom that 10 
 
disasters are more likely to have negative growth effects in developing countries as these may 
lack the material resources and human capital to get back to the status quo ante. At least for 
floods, the mean response of GDP growth for developing countries is positive.  
Finally,  we  looked  at  the  growth  response  to  a  shock  defined  as  an  increase  of  one 
standard  deviation  in  the  number  of  people  killed  by  floods.  Neither  total  growth  nor  its 
subcomponents are affected by shocks to this variable. The results do not change when we split 
the  sample  between  developed  and  developing  countries.  As  argued  in  the  introduction,  the 
number of people killed by  floods is a noisier  indicator of physical intensity than the flood 
magnitude variable used in this paper. 
4.2 Potential Transmission Mechanisms 
We present the estimates of equation (1) in order to shed some light on the possible transmission 
mechanisms of flood shock. Table 5.1 estimates equation (1) for the GDP growth rate  using the 
full sample. In column (1) we only include, in addition of lagged GDP growth, the exogenous 
flood variables. Of those only average flood magnitude is significant at a 5 percent level and its 
sign is consistent with the correlations in Table 3 and the impulse response functions in Figure 1. 
In the second column we include lagged average magnitude, that as we would expect exhibits a 
larger coefficient than average in levels, which again is consistent with the flood shock having a 
delayed effect on GDP growth.  
For column 3 we repeated the estimation including all the 'other' macroeconomic controls  
and  their  interactions  with  the  flood  variables  to  investigate  the  potential  channels  of 
transmission of flood shocks. Only the significant coefficients are reported. The results indicate 
that  although  the  contemporaneous  effect  of  the  shock  (in  terms  of  an  increase  of  average 
magnitude) is negative, it is less so, and becomes positive when it is accompanied by investment 11 
 
in fixed capital. Infrastructure replacement could be one of the channels through which floods 
stimulate non-agricultural output growth. 
A comparison of Tables 5.2 and 5.3 indicates that the positive impact of floods on overall 
GDP growth is driven by developing countries. None of the flood shocks or interactions are 
significant for the subsample of developed countries in Table 5.3 while the results of Table 5.2 
are very similar to those for the full sample. In Table 5.4, we repeat  the estimation for the 
agricultural output growth rate in developing countries. Interestingly, the positive impact of a 
flood shock (defined as an increase in average magnitude) does not seem to be driven by an 
increase  in  gross  fixed  capital  formation.  This  is  to  be  expected  as  investment  goods  are 
produced in the manufacturing sector. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The  paper  uses  pooled  observations  from  118  countries  between  1985  and  2008    to 
compute average responses of growth to major flood events. We use a unique flood-specific data 
set that allows us to construct three different types of flood shocks: an additional „typical‟ large 
flood event, an exogenous increase in the magnitude of the average flood, and an increase in the 
death toll.   Many papers on the economics of natural disasters define severity of a disaster as a 
function of the number of people killed or affected by floods, but our results suggest that the 
number of people killed by floods is a noisier indicator of flood shocks than average physical 
flood magnitude, or the number of floods. 
Our results show that flood shocks tend to have positive impacts on GDP growth rates. 
As we would expect, these positive impacts are not experienced on the year of the flood. The 
delay in the overall growth response seems to be driven by the agricultural sector for which the 12 
 
and, as Fomby et al. (2009) point out, could be due to potentially beneficial effects of floods on 
land productivity that manifest on the following harvest cycle. Looking at the different dynamic 
paths in developing and developed countries lends support to this argument. The increase on 
agricultural  growth  in  the  year  after  the  flood  is  larger  and  more  persistent  in  developing 
countries which typically rely on more traditional, less intensive forms of agriculture. In fact, 
developed countries do not experience a positive impact of floods on overall growth, the positive 
impact  on  agricultural  growth  in  developed  countries  does  not  seem  to  spill  over  to  the 
manufacturing and service sector.  
These results are consistent with the result of Fomby et. al (2009), but contradict the 
conventional wisdom that disasters are more likely to have negative growth effects in developing 
countries.  At  least  for  floods  in  this  new  dataset,  the  mean  response  of  GDP  growth  for 
developing  countries  is  positive.  This  could  be  due  to  the  larger  relative  importance  of  the 
agricultural sector on overall GDP, as implicit in the argument of Fomby et al. (2009). But 
looking more in-depth at potential transmission mechanisms, our results suggest the importance 
of  an  investment  channel:  the  impact  of  growth  in  developing  countries  is  stronger  when 
accompanied by gross capital formation. 13 
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TABLE 1. Variable description and sources 










Log difference of per capita GDP (in PPP, constant 
2005 intnl $) 
 
Ag. Growth  Growth rate of real per 
capita agricultural value 
added  
 
WDI (2010)  Log difference of agricultural VA – population 
growth (in PPP, constant 2005 intnl $) 
Non Ag. 
Growth 




WDI (2010)  Log difference of non-agricultural VA – population 
growth (in PPP, constant 2005 intnl $) 
Number floods  Annual number of large 
floods 
DFO (2010)  Floods with "significant damage to structures or 
agriculture, long (decades) reported intervals since 
the last similar event, and/or fatalities." Multi-




Physical intensity of the 
average flood 
DFO (2010)  = log(average duration in days * average affected 




Number of people killed by 
floods in a year 
 
DFO (2010)   
Corruption  Corruption indicator  PRS (2010)  Larger values denote better institutions 
 
Ethnic tensions  Ethnic tensions indicator  PRS (2010)  Larger values denote better institutions 
 
Domestic credit  Domestic credit to the 
private sector 
 
WDI (2010)  Expressed as percentage of GDP 
GFCF  Gross fixed capital 
formation 
WDI (2010)  Expressed as percentage of GDP 16 
 
TABLE 2. Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
All countries (118 countries, n=2150) 
Growth  0.022  0.044  -0.40  0.285 
Agricultural Growth  -0.022  0.11  -0.94  0.67 
Non-agricultural 
growth 
0.009  0.06  -0.43  0.521 
Number of floods  1.14  2.63  0  32 
Average magnitude  4.95  6.22  0  18.87 
Total deaths  220.81  4612.07  0  160027 
Domestic credit  47.53  43.04  0.68  247.65 
Gross fixed capital 
formation 
21.32  6.21  2.25  57.71 
Corruption  3.06  1.33  0  6 
Ethnic tensions  4.01  1.43  0  6 
Developing countries (84 countries, n=1520) 
Growth  0.021  0.049  -0.40  0.285 
Agricultural Growth  -0.017  0.12  -0.94  0.67 
Non-agricultural 
growth 
0.006  0.068  -0.43  0.521 
Number of floods  1.19  2.458  0  24 
Average magnitude  5.49  6.433  0  18.87 
Total deaths  308.07  5483.26  0  160027 
Domestic credit  31.08  29.90  0.68  210.42 
Gross fixed capital 
formation 
20.81  6.64  2.25  57.71 
Corruption  2.56  0.99  0  6 
Ethnic tensions  3.70  1.44  0  6 
Developed countries (34 countries, n=630) 
Growth  0.023  0.031  -0.266  0.131 
Agricultural Growth  -0.032  0.09  -0.617  0.294 
Non-agricultural 
growth 
0.016  0.04  -0.328  0.133 
Number of floods  1.04  3.02  0  32 
Average magnitude  3.63  5.47  0  16.88 
Total deaths  10.27  53.68  0  1074 
Domestic credit  87.22  44.01  20.61  247.65 
Gross fixed capital 
formation 
22.55  4.81  11.93  38.97 
Corruption  4.28  1.23  2.00  6 
Ethnic tensions  4.77  1.08  0.5  6 17 
 
 
TABLE 3. Correlation coefficients 












GFCF  Corrupt.  Ethnic 
Tensions 
All countries 
Growth  0.32  0.82  0.10  0.10  0.004  0.04  0.30  -0.02  0.13 
Agric growth    -0.06  0.04  0.05  -0.003  -0.02  0.03  -0.05  -0.0007 
Non Ag growth      0.09  0.09  0.004  0.08  0.3  0.03  0.18 
Number floods        0.55  0.13  0.21  0.14  -0.05  -0.07 
Av. Magnitude          0.06  0.07  0.09  -0.12  -0.12 
Total deaths            -0.02  0.004  -0.05  -0.06 
Domestic credit              0.29  0.45  0.34 
GFCF                0.07  0.18 
Corruption                  0.37 
Developing countries 
Growth  0.35  0.81  0.15  0.13  0.004  0.09  0.31  -0.04  0.15 
Agric growth    -0.09  0.06  0.05  -0.005  0.04  0.05  -0.03  0.04 
Non Ag growth      0.14  0.12  0.007  0.09  0.32  -0.03  0.18 
Number floods        0.56  0.16  0.24  0.24  -0.08  -0.08 
Av. Magnitude          0.06  0.15  0.13  -0.05  -0.10 
Total deaths            -0.005  0.008  -0.06  -0.06 
Domestic credit              0.35  0.15  0.19 
GFCF                0.06  0.16 
Corruption                  0.20 
Developed countries 
Growth  0.20  0.93  -0.04  -0.006  0.03  -0.07  0.22  -0.05  0.01 
Agric growth    0.11  -0.007  0.04  0.015  -0.05  -0.04  0.03  -0.05 
Non Ag growth      -0.04  0.008  0.04  -0.061  0.17  0.06  0.06 
Number floods        0.55  0.35  0.35  -0.10  0.01  -0.01 
Av. Magnitude          0.31  0.26  0.017  -0.06  -0.006 
Total deaths            0.19  0.008  -0.03  0.07 
Domestic credit              0.12  0.17  0.18 
GFCF                -0.17  0.05 
Corruption                  0.31 
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TABLE 4. Impulse response functions to shocks to flood variables 
    GDP growth  Agricultural growth  Non agricultural growth 
All countries 
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Period 2   0.005323** 
(0.00130) 
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We do not report the impulse response numbers to shocks to the number of deaths, since its impact is not significant. 
** denotes significant at a 5% level. The cumulative effect measures the total effect of the shock after 10 periods.  19 
 
  
TABLE 5.1. Estimated models (per capita GDP growth rates, all countries) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 


















Number of floods  0.00001 
(0.02) 
   
Total deaths  -0.0001 
(-0.43) 
   
Domestic credit      -0.00021** 
(-4.31) 
Corruption      -0.004** 
(-3.82) 
Interactive efffects 
magnitude (with gross 
fixed capital 
formation) 
    7.13E-05** 
(3.39) 
Cross- country Fixed 
effects 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R
2   0.207  0.211  0.25 
Equation (1): we only include exogenous flood variables as explanatory variables of per capita GDP growth rates, jointly with the 
lagged growth rate.  
Equation (2): we also include lag values of the exogenous flood variables, obtaining only significant effects for the variable 
measuring the average magnitude of the flood.  
Equation  (3):  we  estimate  the  model  including  interactive  effects  of  each  of  the  flood  variables  with  the  macroeconomic 
variables,  finding  significants  effects  only  for  the  interaction  of  the  average  magnitude  of  the  flood  with  the  gross  fixed 
investment.  




TABLE 5.2. Estimated models (per capita GDP growth rates, developing countries) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 


















Number of floods  0.0003 
(0.26) 
   
Total deaths  -1.2E-07 
(-0.42) 
   
Domestic credit      -0.0002** 
(-2.98) 
Corruption      -0.004** 
(-3.02) 
Ethnic tensions       
Gross Fixed capital 
formation 
     
Interactive efffects 
magnitude (with gross 
fixed capital 
formation) 
    8.26E-05** 
(3.32) 
Cross- country Fixed 
effects 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R
2   0.20  0.21  0.252 
Equation (1): we only include exogenous flood variables as explanatory variables of per capita GDP growth rates, jointly with the 
lagged growth rate.  
Equation (2): we also include lag values of the exogenous flood variables, obtaining only significant effects for the variable 
measuring the average magnitude of the flood.  
Equation  (3):  we  estimate  the  model  including  interactive  effects  of  each  of  the  flood  variables  with  the  macroeconomic 
variables,  finding  significants  effects  only  for  the  interaction  of  the  average  magnitude  of  the  flood  with  the  gross  fixed 
investment.  
* and ** indicate significant at the 10 and 5% level, respectively. In parenthesis, the statistic for testing the non-significance null 
hypothesis.  21 
 
TABLE 5.3. Estimated models (per capita GDP growth rates, developed countries) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 


















Number of floods  -0.0003 
(-0.43) 
   
Total deaths  4.6E-06 
(0.18) 
   
Domestic credit      -0.00014** 
(-3.25) 
Corruption      -0.003** 
(-2.10) 
Interactive efffects 
magnitude (with gross 
fixed capital 
formation) 
    7.45E-06 
(0.17) 
Cross- country Fixed 
effects 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R
2   0.257  0.26  0.25 
Equation (1): we only include exogenous flood variables as explanatory variables of per capita GDP growth rates, jointly with the 
lagged growth rate.  
Equation (2): we also include lag values of the exogenous flood variables, obtaining no significant effects for any of the flood 
variables.  
Equation  (3):  we  estimate  the  model  including  interactive  effects  of  each  of  the  flood  variables  with  the  macroeconomic 
variables,  finding  significants  effects  only  for  the  interaction  of  the  average  magnitude  of  the  flood  with  the  gross  fixed 
investment.  
* and ** indicate significant at the 10 and 5% level, respectively. In parenthesis, the statistic for testing the non-significance null 
hypothesis.  22 
 
 TABLE 5.4. Estimated models (agricultural per capita GDP growth rates, developing countries) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 


















Number of floods  0.0013 
(0.55) 
   
Total deaths  -2.6E-07 
(-0.42) 
   
Domestic credit      -0.00016 
(-0.57) 
Corruption      -0.007* 
(-1.66) 
Ethnic tensions      -0.0002 
(-0.05) 
Gross Fixed capital 
formation 
    -0.0009 
(-1.05) 
Interactive efffects 
magnitude (with gross 
fixed capital 
formation) 
    -4.8E-05 
(-0.57) 
Cross- country Fixed 
effects 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R
2   -0.004  0.001  0.03 
Equation (1): we only include exogenous flood variables as explanatory variables of per capita GDP growth rates, jointly with the 
lagged growth rate.  
Equation (2): we also include lag values of the exogenous flood variables, obtaining only significant effects for the variable 
measuring the average magnitude of the flood.  
Equation  (3):  we  estimate  the  model  including  interactive  effects  of  each  of  the  flood  variables  with  the  macroeconomic 
variables,  finding  significants  effects  only  for  the  interaction  of  the  average  magnitude  of  the  flood  with  the  gross  fixed 
investment.  






FIGURE 1.  Response of growth rates to a Shock (Number of floods) 
All countries 
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Developed countries 
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FIGURE 2. Response of growth rates to a Shock (Average magnitude) 
All countries 
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Developed countries 
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FIGURE 3. Response of growth rates to a Shock (Number of deaths by floods) 
All countries 
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The solid lines denote impulse-responses and the doted lines are 95% error bands.  
 